Abstract. Besides the better-known Nelson's Logic and Paraconsistent Nelson's Logic, in "Negation and separation of concepts in constructive systems" (1959), David Nelson introduced a logic called S with the aim of analyzing the constructive content of provable negation statements in mathematics. Motivated by results from Kleene, in "On the Interpretation of Intuitionistic Number Theory" (1945), Nelson investigated a more symmetric recursive definition of truth, according to which a formula could be either primitively verified or refuted. The logic S was defined by means of a calculus lacking the contraction rule and having infinitely many schematic rules, and no semantics was provided. This system received little attention from researchers; it even remained unnoticed that on its original presentation it was inconsistent. Fortunately, the inconsistency was caused by typos and by a rule whose hypothesis and conclusion were swapped. We investigate a corrected version of the logic S, and focus on its propositional fragment, showing that it is algebraizable in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi (in fact, implicative) with respect to a certain class of involutive residuated lattices. We thus introduce the first (algebraic) semantics for S as well as a finite Hilbert-style calculus equivalent to Nelson's presentation; we also compare S with the other two above-mentioned logics of the Nelson family. Our approach is along the same lines of (and partly relies on) previous algebraic work on Nelson's logics due to M. Busaniche, R. Cignoli, S. Odintsov, M. Spinks and R. Veroff.
Introduction
To study the notion of constructible falsity, David Nelson introduced a number of systems of non-classical logic that combine an intuitionistic approach to truth with a dual-intuitionistic treatment of falsity. Nelson's logics (S, N 3, and N 4) accept some notable theorems of classical logic, such as ∼∼ϕ ⇔ ϕ, while rejecting others, such as (ϕ ⇒ (ϕ ⇒ ψ)) ⇒ (ϕ ⇒ ψ) and (ϕ ∧ ∼ϕ) ⇒ ψ. Nelson introduced these logics with the aim of studying constructive proofs in Number Theory. To such an end, he gave a definition of truth [14, Definition 1] (analogous to Kleene's [12, p. 112 ]) according to which either a formula or its negation should be realized by some natural number.
Nelson's logic N 3 was introduced in [14] and N 4, a paraconsistent version of N 3, was introduced in [1] . N 3 is in fact an axiomatic extension of N 4 by the axiom In [15] Nelson also introduced the logic S, aimed at the study of realizability. As suggested by L. Humberstone [11, Ch. 8.2, p. 1239-40] , the introduction of S can perhaps also be viewed as an attempt to remedy what some logicians consider an undesirable feature of N 3 (and N 4), namely the fact that there are formulas ϕ, ψ in N 3 (and N 4) that are mutually interderivable but such that their negations ∼ϕ, ∼ψ fail to be interderivable. It is useful to recall that these two phenomena are in general disassociated; the latter stems from the failure of the contraposition law for the so-called weak implication connective → of N 3 (and N 4), while the former entails that N 3 and N 4 are non-congruential (or, as other authors say, nonself-extensional) logics: that is, the logical interderivability relation fails to be a congruence of the formula algebra. Now, while S is also a non-congruential logic, its implication connective (here denoted ⇒) does satisfy the contraposition law: in fact in S one has that (ϕ ⇒ ψ)∧(ψ ⇒ ϕ) is a theorem if and only if (∼ϕ ⇒ ∼ψ)∧(∼ψ ⇒ ∼ϕ) is a theorem. In other words S, although non-congruential if we look at its interderivability relation, enjoys at least ⇔-congruentiality in Humberstone's terminology (relative to the bi-implication ⇔ defined, in the usual way, as follows:
2 . Nelson's original presentation of S has infinitely many schematic rules and no algebraic semantics; [15] also leaves unclear whether N 3 is comparable with S (and if so, which of the two is stronger). Unlike its relatives N 3 and N 4, the logic S received little attention after [15] and basic questions about it were left open, for example: Is S algebraizable? Can S be finitely axiomatized? What are the exact relations between S and N 3, and between S and N 4? In the present paper we will use the modern techniques of algebraic logic to answer these questions.
Our study will follow the same lines of previous papers by M. Busaniche, R. Cignoli, S. Odintsov, M. Spinks and R. Veroff on (algebraic models of) N 3 and N 4 (see, e.g., [5, 6, 16, 19, 20] ), which in turn rely on classic work by H. Rasiowa on the algebraization of non-classical logics. These investigations have shown that the algebraic approach to Nelson's logics may be particularly insightful, as it allows to view them as either conservative expansions of the negation-free fragment of intuitionistic logic by the addition of a new unary logical connective of strong negation (∼) or as axiomatic extensions of well-known substructural/relevance logics. The first perspective allows us to establish a particularly useful link between algebraic models of N 3/N 4 and models of intuitionistic logic (via the so-called twist-structure construction -see especially [16] ), while the second affords the possibility of exploiting general results and techniques that have been introduced in the study of residuated structures; this is the approach of [19, 20] as well as [13] , and that we shall also take in the present paper (see especially Subsection 2.2).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we present the propositional fragment of the logic S and highlight some of its theorems, which will later be used to establish its algebraizability. In Section 2 we prove that S is algebraizable and present its equivalent algebraic semantics. In Section 3 we provide another calculus for S, one that has a finite number of schematic axioms and only one schematic rule (modus ponens). We point out that having only one rule makes it easy to prove the Deduction Metatheorem in the standard way using induction over derivations. In 2 Actually, we now know that N 3 (and N 4) are also ⇔-congruential for a suitable choice of implication ⇒ (called strong implication) that can be defined using the weak one →; but Nelson may well not have been aware of this while writing [15] . Section 4 we prove that N 3 is a proper axiomatic extension of S, and that S and N 4 are not extensions of each other. Proofs of some of the main new results are to be found in an Appendix to this paper.
Nelson's logic S
In this section we recall Nelson's original presentation of the propositional fragment of S [15] and we highlight some theorems of S that will be used further on to establish its algebraizability.
As is now usual, here we take a sentential logic L to be a structure containing a substitution-invariant consequence relation ⊢ L defined over an algebra of formulas Fm freely generated by a denumerable set of propositional variables {p, q, r, . . .} over a given language Σ. We will henceforth refer to algebras using boldface strings (such as Fm and A), and use the corresponding italicized version of these same strings (such as F m and A) to refer to their corresponding carriers. Fixing a given logic, we will use ϕ, ψ and γ, possibly decorated with subscripts, to refer to arbitrary formulas of it. Definition 1.1. Nelson's logic S = Fm, ⊢ S is the sentential logic in the language ∧, ∨, ⇒, ∼, ⊥ of type 2, 2, 2, 1, 0 defined by the Hilbert-style calculus with the schematic axioms and rules listed below. As usual, ϕ ⇔ ψ will be used to abbreviate
In the above rules, following Nelson's notation, Γ = {ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , . . . , ϕ n } is a finite set of formulas and the following abbreviations are employed:
Moreover, when Γ = ∅, we take Γ ⇒ ϕ := ϕ. Notice that we have fixed obvious infelicities in the rules (∧l2), (∧r) and (∼ ⇒ r) as they appear in [15, pp.214-5] . For example, the original rule (∧l2) in Nelson's paper was:
This clearly makes the logic inconsistent. Indeed, taking ϕ = γ, we have:
Choosing ψ as an axiom, we would conclude thus that γ is a theorem for any formula γ.
We note in passing that the rule (C), called weak condensation by Nelson, replaces (and is indeed a weaker form of) the usual contraction rule:
Rule (C) is also known in the literature as 3-2 contraction [17, p. 389] and corresponds, on algebraic models, to the property of three-potency (see Subsection 2.2). Also, do note that we obtain modus ponens, (MP), by taking Γ = ∅ in rule (E):
It is worth noticing that, despite appearances, Nelson's system S is a Hilbertstyle calculus, rather than a sequent system. Its underlying notion of derivation, ⊢ S , is the usual one. Henceforth, for any logic L and any set of formulas Γ ∪ Π, we shall write Γ ⊢ L Π to say that Γ ⊢ L π for every π ∈ Π. By Γ ⊣⊢ L Π we will abbreviate the double assertion Γ ⊢ L Π and Π ⊢ L Γ.
One of the crucial steps in proving that a logic is algebraizable (in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi [3, Definition 2.2]) is to prove that it satisfies certain congruence properties. In the present context, this entails checking that ϕ ⇔ ψ ⊢ S ∼ϕ ⇔ ∼ψ and
The following auxiliary results will be used to prove that much, in the next section.
Proposition 1. The following formulas are theorems of S:
(
Proof. All justifying derivations are straightforward. We detail the first item, as an example:
Proof. Such a logical equivalence is easily justified by Prop.1.1-2 and by considering the rule (∧r) with Γ = ∅.
S is algebraizable
In this section we prove that S is algebraizable in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi (it is, in fact, implicative [8, Definition 2.3]), and we give two alternative presentations for its equivalent algebraic semantics (to be called 'S-algebras'). The first one is obtained via the algorithm of [3, Theorem 2.17], while the second one is closer to the usual axiomatizations of classes of residuated lattices, which are the algebraic counterparts of many logics in the substructural family. As a particular advantage, the second presentation of S-algebras will allow us to see at a glance that they form an equational class, and will also make it easier to compare them with other known classes of algebras for substructural logics.
Definition 2.1. An implicative logic is a sentential logic L whose underlying algebra of formulas in a language Σ has a term α(p, q) in two variables that satisfies the following conditions:
Given an algebra of formulas Fm of the language Σ, the associated set F m × F m of equations will henceforth be denoted by Eq; we will write ϕ ≈ ψ rather than (ϕ, ψ) ∈ Eq. Let A be an algebra with the same similarity type as Fm. A homomorphism V : Fm → A is called a valuation in A. We say that a valuation V in A satisfies ϕ ≈ ψ in A when V(ϕ) = V(ψ); we say that an algebra A satisfies ϕ ≈ ψ when all valuations in A satisfy it.
Definition 2.2. A logic L is algebraizable if and only if there are equations E(ϕ) ⊆ Eq and a transform Eq
We call any such E(ϕ) the set of defining equations and any such ∆(ϕ, ψ) the set of equivalence formulas of L.
Clarifying the notation in [Alg], recall that the set E(ϕ) contains pairs of formulas and we write ϕ ≈ ψ simply as syntactic sugar for a pair (ϕ, ψ) belonging to this set. Now, ∆(ϕ, ψ) transforms an equation into a set of formulas. Accordingly, we take ∆(E(ϕ)) as Every implicative logic L is algebraizable with respect to the class Alg * L [8, Proposition 3.15], and such algebraizability is witnessed by the defining equations E(ϕ) := {ϕ ≈ α(ϕ, ϕ)} and the equivalence formulas ∆(ϕ, ψ) := {α(ϕ, ψ), α(ψ, ϕ)}. These are in fact the sets of defining equations and of equivalence formulas that we will use in the remainder of the present paper.
We can now prove (the details are to be found in the Appendix) that:
Theorem 2.4. The calculus ⊢ S is implicative and thus algebraizable. The Simplication is given by ⇒, that is, α(p, q) := p ⇒ q.
In the case of S we have thus that E(ϕ) = {ϕ ≈ ϕ ⇒ ϕ} and ∆(ϕ, ψ) = {ϕ ⇒ ψ, ψ ⇒ ϕ}. , we know that the equivalent algebraic semantics of S is the class of algebras given by Def. 2.5 below. We denote by Ax the set of axioms and denote by Inf R the set the inference rules of S, given in Def. 1.1.
Definition 2.5. An S-algebra is a structure A = A, ∧, ∨, ⇒, ∼, 0, 1 of type 2, 2, 2, 1, 0, 0 that satisfies the following equations and quasiequations:
Regarding the notation in the above definition, E(∆(ϕ, ϕ)) stands for the equation
In fact, these conditions are telling us that for each axiom ϕ of S we have the equation ϕ ≈ 1, and for each rule ϕ ⊢ S ψ of S , in the corresponding algebras we have the quasiequation: if ϕ ≈ 1, then ψ ≈ 1. We shall denote by E(An) the equation given in Def. 2.5.3 for the axiom An (for 1 ≤ n ≤ 5), and by Q(R) the quasiequation given in Def. 2.5.4 for the rule R of S. From this point on, in this subsection, in order to make the propositions and their proofs shorter, we shall also use the following abbreviations:
x * y := ∼(x ⇒ ∼y) x 2 := x * x x n := x * (x n−1 ), for n > 2 The following result, whose proof may be found in the Appendix, will help us in checking that the class of S-algebras forms a variety.
Proposition 3. Let A be an S-algebra and let a, b, c ∈ A. Then:
(1) a ⇒ a = 1 = ∼0. 
In the next section we introduce an equivalent presentation of S-algebras which takes precisely the properties of Prop. 3 above as postulates. In the context of the above definition, the integrality condition corresponds to having 1 not only as a maximum but also as the multiplicative unit of the operation * , that is, x * 1 = x. For a CIBRL this condition immediately follows from Def. 2.6.1-2.
Setting ∼x := x ⇒ 0, we say that a residuated lattice is involutive [10, p.186] when ∼∼a = a (in such a case, it follows that a ⇒ b = ∼b ⇒ ∼a). We say that a residuated lattice is 3-potent when it satisfies the equation x 2 ≤ x 3 . While we have earlier defined * from ⇒, and now * is a primitive operation, we can show that every CIBRL satisfies x * y = ∼(x ⇒ ∼y) (see [10, Lemma 5 
.1]).
Definition 2.7. An S ′ -algebra is an involutive 3-potent CIBRL.
The proof of the following result may be found in the Appendix:
Lemma 2.8.
(1) Any CIBRL satisfies the equation (x∨y) * z ≈ (x * z)∨(y * z).
Since involutive residuated lattices form an equational class [9, Theorem 2.7], it is obvious that S ′ -algebras are also an equational class. From Prop. 3, we immediately conclude the following: Proposition 4. Let A = A, ∧, ∨, ⇒, ∼, 0, 1 be an S-algebra. Defining x * y := ∼(x ⇒ ∼y), we have that A ′ = A, ∧, ∨, * , ⇒, 0, 1 is an S ′ -algebra.
Conversely, we are going to see that every S ′ -algebra gives rise to an S-algebra by checking that all (quasi) equations introduced in Definition 2.5 are satisfied (the proof may be found in the Appendix): Proposition 5. Let A = A, ∧, ∨, * , ⇒, 0, 1 be an S ′ -algebra. Defining ∼x := x ⇒ 0, we have that A ′ = A, ∧, ∨, ⇒, ∼, 0, 1 is an S-algebra.
Thus, the classes of S-algebras and of S ′ -algebras are term-equivalent. The presentation given in Definition 2.7 has several advantages in what concerns the study of the semantics of S. For example, it is now straightforward to check that the three-element MV-algebra [7] is a model of Nelson's logic S. This in turn allows one to prove that the formulas which Nelson claims not to be derivable in S [15, p.213] are indeed not valid (see [13] ).
A finite Hilbert-style calculus for S
In this section we introduce a finite Hilbert-style calculus (which is an extension of the calculus IP C * \c, called intuitionistic logic without contraction, of [4] ) that is algebraizable with respect to the class of S ′ -algebras. We are thus going to have two logics that are both algebraizable with respect to the same variety with the same defining equations and equivalence formulas; from this we will obtain an equivalence between our calculus and Nelson's.
The logic S ′ = Fm, ⊢ S ′ is the sentential logic in the language ∧, ∨, ⇒, * , ∼, ⊥, ⊤ of type 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 0, 0 defined by the Hilbert-style calculus with the following schematic axioms and with modus ponens as the only rule:
As before, ϕ ⇔ ψ abbreviates (ϕ ⇒ ψ) ∧ (ψ ⇒ ϕ), while the connective * is here taken as primitive. Axioms (A1')-(A13'), (A14'(⇒)) -(ϕ ⇒ ψ) ⇒ (∼ψ ⇒ ∼ϕ), (A15'(⇒)) -ϕ ⇒ ∼∼ϕ, (A16') and (A17') of our calculus are the same as those of IP C * \c as presented in [4, Table 3 .2], where it is proven that IP C * \c is algebraizable. We added the converse implication in axioms (A14') and (A15') to characterize involution and we added the axiom (A18') to characterize 3-potency. As algebraizability is preserved by axiomatic extensions (cf. [8, Proposition 3 .31]) we have the following results:
Theorem 3.1. The calculus S ′ is algebraizable (with the same defining equations and equivalence formulas as S) with respect to the class of S ′ -algebras.
Proof. We know from [4, Theorem 5.1] that IP C * \c is algebraizable with respect to the class of commutative integral bounded residuated lattices with the same defining equations and equivalence formulas already considered above. The axioms that were now added imply that the algebraic semantics of our extension is involutive and 3-potent, i.e., it is an S ′ -algebra.
Corollary 1. S and S ′ define the same logic.
Proof. Let K S be the class of S-algebras. Thanks to Prop. 4 and Prop. 5 we know that K S is also the class of S ′ -algebras. The result follows now from [8, Proposition 3.47] , that gives us an algorithm to find a Hilbert-style calculus for an algebraizable logic from its quasivariety, defining equations and equivalence formulas. As Salgebras and S ′ -algebras are the same class of algebras and their defining equations and equivalence formulas are the same, the Hilbert-style calculus given by the algorithm must do the same job as the one we had before.
Working with Nelson's original presentation of S, it can be hard to directly prove some version of the Deduction Metatheorem. Indeed, if we prove it, as usual, by way of an induction over the structure of the derivations, we need to apply the inductive hypothesis over each rule of the system. The advantage of S ′ , in employing such a strategy, is that it has only one inference rule. This allows us to establish:
Proof. Thanks to [9, Corollary 2.15] we have a version of the Deduction Metatheorem for substructural logics wich says that Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊢ ψ iff Γ ⊢ ϕ n ⇒ ψ for some n. In view of (A'18) it is easy to see that in S we can always choose n = 2.
4. Comparing S with N 3 and N 4
As mentioned before, Nelson introduced two other better-known logics, N 3 and N 4, which are also algebraizable with respect to classes of residuated structures (namely, the so-called N 3-lattices and N 4-lattices). A question that immediately arises concerns the precise relation between S and these other logics, or (equivalently) between S-algebras and N 3-and N 4-lattices. In what follows it is worth taking into account that not all S-algebras are distributive (see [13, Example 5 .1]).
N 4.
Definition 4.1. N 4 = Fm, ⊢ N 4 is the sentential logic in the language ∧, ∨, →, ∼ of type 2, 2, 2, 1 defined by the Hilbert-style calculus with the following schematic axioms and modus ponens as the only schematic rule. Below, ϕ ↔ ψ will be used to abbreviate (ϕ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ).
The implication → in N 4 is usually called weak implication, in contrast to the strong implication ⇒ that is defined in N 4 as follows:
As the notation suggests, it is the strong implication that we shall compare with the implication of S. This appears indeed to be the most meaningful choice, for otherwise, since the weak implications of both N 4 and N 3 fail to satisfy contraposition (which holds in S), we would have to say that S is incomparable with both logics.
The logic N 4 is algebraizable (though not implicative) with equivalence formulas {ϕ ⇒ ψ, ψ ⇒ ϕ} and defining equation ϕ ≈ ϕ → ϕ [18, Theorem 2.6]. We notice in passing that the implication in this defining equation could as well be taken to be the strong one, so ϕ ≈ ϕ ⇒ ϕ would work too; in contrast, {ϕ → ψ, ψ → ϕ} would not be a set of equivalence formulas, due precisely to the failure of contraposition. A very simple example of an N 4-lattice is the four-element algebra A 4 whose lattice reduct is the four-element diamond De Morgan algebra. This algebra has carrier A 4 = {0, 1, b, n}, the maximum element of the lattice order being 1, the minimum 0, and b and n being incomparable. The negation (Fig 1) is given by ∼b := b, ∼n := n, ∼1 := 0 and ∼0 := 1. The weak implication is given, for all a ∈ A 4 , by 1 → a = b → a := a and 0 → a = n → a := 1. One can check that A 4 satisfies all properties of Definition 4.2 (in particular, the quotient A 4 /≡ is the two-element Boolean algebra). Proof. We show that not every S-algebra is an N 4-lattice, and that no N 4-lattice is an S-algebra. The first claim follows from the fact that N 4-lattices have a distributive lattice reduct, whereas S-algebras need not be distributive. As to the second, it is sufficient to observe that the equation x ⇒ x ≈ y ⇒ y is satisfied in all S-algebras but does not hold in the four-element N 4-lattice A 4 . There we
Since both N 4 and S are algebraizable logics, this immediately entails that neither N 4 ≤ S nor S ≤ N 4. In logical terms, one can check that the distributivity axiom is valid in N 4 but not in S, whereas the formula (ϕ ⇒ ϕ) ⇒ (ψ ⇒ ψ) is valid in S but not in N 4. Proof. It is known from [19] that every N 3-lattice (the algebraic counterpart of N 3) satisfies all properties of our Definition 2.7, and therefore every N 3-lattice is an S-algebra. On the other hand, the logic N 3 was defined as an axiomatic extension of N 4, therefore it is distributive too, whereas S-algebras need not be distributive (see [13, Example 5 .1]).
Future Work
We have studied S in two directions, through a proof-theoretic approach and through algebraic methods. Concerning the proof-theoretic approach, we have introduced a finite Hilbert-style calculus for S. An interesting question that still remains is about other types of calculi. In this sense we would find it attractive to be able to present a sequent calculus for S enjoying a cut-elimination theorem, so that it could be used to determine, among other things, whether S is decidable and enjoys the Craig interpolation theorem.
As observed in Theorem 3.2, if we let ϕ → ψ := ϕ ⇒ (ϕ ⇒ ψ), then the weak implication → enjoys a version of the Deduction Metatheorem; this suggests that the connective → has a special logical role within S, whereas ⇒ is the key operation on the corresponding algebras. It is well known that the logic N 3 as well as its algebraic counterpart can be equivalently axiomatized by taking either the weak or the strong implication as primitive, defining → from ⇒ as shown above. The analogous result for N 4 has been harder to prove (see [20] ), and the corresponding definition is ϕ → ψ := (ϕ ∧ (((ϕ ∧ (ψ ⇒ ψ)) ⇒ ψ) ⇒ ((ϕ ∧ (ψ ⇒ ψ)) ⇒ ψ))) ⇒ ((ϕ ∧ (ψ ⇒ ψ)) ⇒ ψ).
We can ask a similar question about the logic S and its algebraic counterpart: namely, given that Nelson's axiomatization as well as ours have ⇒ as primitive, is it also possible to axiomatize S(-algebras) by taking the weak implication → as primitive? This question is related to certain algebraic properties that → enjoys on S-algebras. In fact, we have shown in [13, Theorem 4.5] that, analogously to N 3-lattices, S-algebras are a variety of weak Brouwerian semilattices with filter-preserving operations [2, Definition 2.1], which means that they possess an intuitionistic-like internal structure, where a weak relative pseudo-complementation operation (an intuitionistic-like implication) is given precisely by the weak implication. This suggests that one may in fact hope to be able to view (and axiomatize) S as a conservative expansion of some intuitionistic-like positive logic by a strong (involutive) negation, as has been the case of N 3 and N 4.
As hinted above, a more detailed study of S-algebras can be found in the companion paper [13] . Some questions regarding the variety of S-algebras, its extensions, congruences and more relations between S-algebras and other well-known algebras are investigated there. Another question that is still open is which logic (class of algebras) is the infimum of S(-algebras) and N 4(-lattices) -it is easy to see that the least logic extending S and N 4 is precisely N 3.
